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本帖最後由 alisha13 於 2024-3-7 18:23 編輯
No worker should be discriminated against for having a tattoo . But if it is an image that incites hatred, such as a swastika, the symbol of Nazism, of racial supremacy, the problem would have to be reconsidered. If the company decides to fire that employee for that reason, he will be right, concluded the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (SCJN).
This Wednesday, October 30, the First Chamber of the Court resolved a case that poses a dilemma between protecting freedom of expression and what could be an apology for hatred. The story is this: a man was hired as head of billing in a private company, on his first day of work he showed up, showing a tattoo on his neck with a swastika or swastika cross, associated with Nazism.
Among his companions were Jewish people. The Chile Mobile Number List owner of the company himself is too. That same day they complained and stated that “they felt offended, attacked or violated,” according to the direct protection file under review 4865/2018 .
Company personnel called the employee and let him know the discontent of his colleagues. He instructed her that, to remain in office, he must remove his tattoo or hide it. He “immediately refused,” so the company terminated his contract.
Although he signed his resignation and received a settlement, he sued the company and demanded compensation, claiming that he was discriminated against because of his tattoo . That fact, he alleged, “affected the legal assets of his personality, since it caused annoyance, confusion, annoyance and, in general, affectation of his feelings.”
In the trial, the company maintained that the symbol it has tattooed “represented an anti-Semitic expression, which meant hatred and rejection of the Jewish community.” This image affects the dignity of the Jewish people employed in that organization, the lawyers maintained.
In a first ruling, a collegiate circuit court supported the former employee's complaint. The case reached the SCJN and Minister Norma Lucía Piña Hernández was in charge of reviewing it and preparing a draft sentence.
What she resolved, and which was endorsed by the other ministers, is that displaying a tattoo should not be a reason for discrimination at work . But the swastika is something else. “In our cultural sphere, it represents racist (anti-Semitic) hate speech.”
Therefore, having a tattoo like that “lacks constitutional protection because it is contrary to the dignity, equality, security and freedom of expression of the victims, who have no legal duty to tolerate it.”
Freedom of expression vs. hate speech
To reach that conclusion, Minister Norma Lucía Piña reviewed several rights that are at stake in this case. No right can be absolute and sometimes one will trump the other, she argued.
The former employee has the right to free development of personality, which implies the freedom to choose his or her personal appearance .
Another fundamental right you have is freedom of expression. This includes the dissemination of ideas of any kind by any means, procedure or route. “A tattoo is a form of exercise” of freedom of personality and expression.
Now, the wearing of body tattoos has different motivations , said the minister. From the simple pleasure of decorating the skin, to “the display of philosophical, political, religious and social convictions.”
The tattoo that the former worker chose, a swastika cross, “unequivocally represents extreme hate speech, such as the ideology of Nazism.” This position “advocates the superiority of the Aryan race and the physical extermination of races and/or ethnicities that its followers consider 'inferior', especially the Jews.”
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That doctrine, continues the minister, caused the catastrophe of the Holocaust during the Second World War. It has caused not only discrimination, “but incitement to violence that even led to genocide.”
If it represents “extreme hate speech” and generates discrimination, then it is not protected by the Constitution , he concludes. In this way, he decided that the measures adopted by the company, “in the face of the human dignity and safety of its employees and managers, were valid, reasonable and proportional” and did not have to pay compensation for moral damage.
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