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Also have to rotate . -- even more difficult is establishing the guidelines for the mission of these soldiers. Above all: who would give the order to shoot, in case of attack? It's not something a sergeant can do. -- therefore, a small general staff with these powers would have to be established in the area. -- that would only be feasible using the french bases in djibouti or the seychelles islands . -- an 'ad hoc' treaty would have to be signed with france and there is no time frame to do so. With the seychelles islands there is fear of what compensation they would ask for in exchange. -- the government points out the unfeasibility of total protection. It is worth remembering that the waters where basque fishing vessels operate occupy a larger surface area than the mediterranean . -- on the other hand, in defense there is a notable detachment from meeting the demands of the fishermen. The waters frequented by the basques are the richest in tuna precisely because they are waters whose danger deters sailors from other countries from fishing in them. -- the government sees it as an injustice to protect fishing vessels in this case, when there are other fishing grounds , and when most of the fishing is sold in japan at high prices. In defense they do not believe that this fishing is ' the bread of his children'.
The general directorate of fisheries has been trying for some time to convince basque tuna vessels not to fish in those waters and to redirect their activity. -- there is another uncomfortable argument handled by chacón. Somali pirates are precisely converted Special Database tuna fishermen. There have been pirates who, when boarding a ship, the first thing they asked for was food for themselves. In somalia there are no conditions for the trade of this fishery, neither technical (cold chain, etc.) nor political. -- in the government it is believed that, deep down, the basque fishing boats continue to be depleting the natural resources of one of the most failed states in the world. Within the framework of nato and the eu, defense attempted a very controversial move some time ago . The main objective of the international operations deployed in the indian ocean is the protection of united nations ships that supply international cooperation food to millions of somalis . These are the ships most coveted by pirates and the ones that must be protected the most due to their vital role for millions of somalis. Despite everything, spain has tried to get european ships to prioritize aid to spanish ships in case of conflict. Spain has not achieved it. And, at this point, we once again insist on the unfeasibility of protecting ships on an unreachable surface.
Criticism of the decision of the ministry of the interior comes from both an ertzaintza union , esan, and from various nationalist sectors . They assure that among the private escorts there are a large number of inexperienced young people , without training to provide a quality service in the basque country and who only work in search of a succulent salary. The escort group, for its part, describes the accusations as “ lies .” professionals consulted by el confidencial digital defend themselves with data: in the last ten years, the work of private bodyguards in the basque country has meant that there have been no deaths and that several eta attacks against their protected people have been thwarted. Furthermore, they affirm that the preparation of a private escort in protection tasks is much broader than that of the vast majority of ertzainas, passing exhaustive courses and official exams of high demand at the european level. Sources from the department headed by rodolfo ares consulted by ecd assure that the decision is to remove those ertzainas whose work can be replaced and place them in citizen security tasks , such as, for example, regulating traffic.
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